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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
extreme care in the presentation of factual issues in declaratory judgment
proceedings in which coverage cannot be determined solely upon the
allegations of the complaint.
Torts-MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30
(Minn. 1979).
The Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act' imposes significant re-
strictions on the ability of victims of municipal2 negligence to seek re-
dress for injuries. The most important of these restrictions are the
requirements that the plaintiff serve timely notice of a possible tort claim
upon the municipality, and that the action be commenced, in most cases,
within one year of the notice.3 In an effort partially to alleviate the ineq-
uities inherent in these requirements, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
recently abandoned the rule of strict compliance with the notice of claim
1. MINN. STAT. §§ 466.01-.15 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
2. MINN. STAT. § 466.01(1) (1978) defines "municipality" as "any city, whether
organized under home rule charter or otherwise, any county, town, public authority, pub-
lic corporation, special district, school district, however organized, county agricultural so-
ciety organized pursuant to chapter 38, or other political subdivision." Id.
3. See Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 798, § 5, 1963 Minn. Laws 1396, 1398, which was in
effect on the date of the accident in Kossak. It provided:
Every person who claims damages from any municipality for or on account of
any loss or injury within the scope of Section 2 shall cause to be presented to the
governing body of the municipality within 30 days after the alleged loss or injury
a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the
amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Failure to state the amount
of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice; but in
such case, the claimant shall furnish full information regarding the nature and
extent of the injuries and damages within 15 days after demand by the munici-
pality. No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given
and unless the action is commenced within one year after such notice. The time
for giving such notice does not include the time, not exceeding 90 days, during
which the person injured is incapacitated by the injury from giving the notice.
Id. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1978) presently provides:
Except as provided in subdivisions 2 and 3, every person who claims damages
from any municipality for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of
section 466.02 shall cause to be presented to the governing body of the munici-
pality within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury is discovered a notice stat-
ing the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation
or other relief demanded. Actual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the
governing body of the municipality or its insurer on notice of a possible claim
shall be construed to comply with the notice requirements of this section. Fail-
ure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not inval-
idate the notice; but in such case, the claimant shall furnish full information
regarding the nature and extent of the injuries and damages within 15 days after
demand by the municipality. No action therefore shall be maintained unless
such notice has been given and unless the action is commenced within one year
after such notice. The time for giving such notice does not include the time, not
exceeding 90 days, during which the person injured is incapacitated by the in-
jury from giving the notice.
Id. No notice is required for injuries from intentional torts or the use of motor vehicles
owned by a municipality or operated by its employees. Id. § 466.05.
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requirement and has adopted the doctrine of substantial compliance.4 In
Kossak v. Stalhng,5 the court went a step further in reducing restrictions
on tort actions against municipalities by declaring the commencement of
suit requirement unconstitutional.6
In Kossak plaintiff brought suit against the City of Duluth and Stall-
ing, a Duluth employee, for injuries plaintiff suffered in an automobile
accident allegedly caused by Stalling's negligence.7 Plaintiff never filed a
notice of claim with the city,8 and did not bring suit until four years after
the accident. 9 Defendant Stalling had, however, submitted a "vehicle
collision report," noting that the plaintiff was apparently injured, to the
city attorney's office two weeks after the accident.1o The trial court
granted the City of Duluth's motion for dismissal and entered judgment
on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice of claim and
commencement of suit provisions of the Municipal Tort Liability Act."I
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the order and held, in accord-
ance with its prior decision in Kel( v. City of Rochester,12 that actual notice
4. See, e.g., Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 333, 231 N.W.2d 275, 278
(1975) (substantial compliance is accomplished by actual notice on the part of the munici-
pality even if such notice is acquired through its own personnel or procedures); Jenkins v.
Board of Educ., 303 Minn. 437, 440, 228 N.W.2d 265, 268 (1975) (substantial compliance
with the requirement of timeliness of the service or notice is all that is required when
school district has actual notice within the statutory period); Seifert v. City of Minneapo-
lis, 298 Minn. 35, 42-43, 213 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1973) (doctrine of substantial compliance
extended to manner of service by holding that service of notice on city alderman after
business hours was sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement); Olander v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 293 Minn. 162, 169-70, 197 N.W.2d 438, 442 (1972) (except for elements
of timeliness and manner of service, substantial compliance with notice requirements is all
that is required). The substantial compliance doctrine evolved at least partly due to the
frequently-announced doctrine that notice requirements are to be liberally construed. See,
e.g., Grams v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 286 Minn. 481, 489, 176 N.W.2d 536,
541 (1970); Brown v. City of Chattanooga, 180 Tenn. 284, 288, 174 S.W.2d 466, 468
(1943); Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 164 Wis. 77, 80, 159 N.W. 581, 582
(1916). In addition, because one purpose of the notice of claim requirement is to expedite
municipal investigations, Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d
205, 207 (1966), defects in the giving of notice that do not substantially hinder municipal
defendants in investigating claims have been allowed. See, e.g., Russell v. City of Minne-
apolis, 259 Minn. 355, 356-57, 107 N.W.2d 711, 713 (1961) (6 to 15 foot error in descrip-
tion of place of injury is permissible).
5. 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979).
6. Id. at 35.
7. Ida. at 31-32.
8. Id. at 32.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 33.
11. Id. at 32; see Brief for Appellant at 2.
12. 304 Minn. 328, 231 N.W.2d 275 (1975). In Kelly plaintiff suffered a severe injury
at a municipal swimming pool. The accident took place in the presence of a lifeguard who
assisted plaintiff and filed a written report with the city a few days later. Plaintiff did not
give formal written notice to the city until after the statutory period had expired. Id. at
19801
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to the municipality of a possible claim satisfied the notice of claim re-
quirement.13 More important, however, was the court's holding that the
one-year commencement of suit requirement violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.14 Plaintiff's claim was thus
subject to the usual six-year limitation period for negligence actions.15
Despite recent attacks by courts and commentators on the constitu-
tionality of the notice of claim requirement,16 the Kossak court refrained
from finding the provision constitutionally infirm. Because the City of
Duluth had received actual notice, the case fell squarely within the sub-
stantial compliance doctrine.t 7 The court, therefore, did not find it nec-
essary to address the constitutional issue.18 Moreover, the court took into
330, 231 N.W.2d at 276. The court held that in the absence of a showing of prejudice,
actual notice to the municipality of facts sufficient to put it on notice of a possible claim is
all that the notice provision requires. Id. at 333, 231 N.W.2d at 278. The court noted that
MINN. STAT. § 466.05 provides only that one claiming damages must see that notice is
presented to the governing body of the municipality, but does not expressly impose that
duty on the injured party. "To decide otherwise would make the notice requirement
nothing more than a formal, procedural impediment to suit, of little purpose other than to
void an otherwise valid claim." Id. at 333, 231 N.W.2d at 277-78. The Kossak court cited
the Kelly holding and apparently felt assured that the vehicle accident report constituted
actual notice sufficient to satisfy the notice of claim requirement. See 277 N.W.2d at 33.
13. See 277 N.W.2d at 33.
14. Id. at 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "[N]o state shall .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
15. 277 N.W.2d at 35 n.7. MINN. STAT. § 541.05(1) (1978) provides that "[e]xcept
where the uniform commercial code otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be
commenced within six years: . . . for any other injury to the person or rights of another,
not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated."
16. See, e.g., Salavea v. City of Honolulu, 517 P.2d 51 (Hawaii 1973); Lorton v.
Brown County Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 I11. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966);
Note, Notice of Claim Prozirions." An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 417,
418-19 (1975); Note, Notice of Claim Under the Municipal Tort Claims Act-The Watchdog With
Plenty of Teeth, 23 DRAKE L. REv. 670, 682-86 (1974); Note, Notice of Claim Requirement
Under the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 113 (1978).
17. See note 4 supra.
18. 277 N.W.2d at 33; see Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96
N.W.2d 673 (1959). In Greenman the court stated:
since an act [of the legislature] is presumed to be constitutional, it will not be
declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears clearly or unless it is
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it violates some constitutional provision.
The power of the court to declare a law unconstitutional is to be exercised only
when absolutely necessary in the particular case and then with great caution.
Id. at 403, 96 N.W.2d at 679 (quoting Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn.
164, 173, 91 N.W.2d 642, 650 (1958)). Other courts have not been so reluctant to reach
the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194
N.W.2d 700 (1972) (60-day notice of claim statute held not reasonably related to a legiti-
mate governmental objective and therefore in violation of state and federal constitutions);
Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (notice of claim requirement denies equal
protection), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85
Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975) (same); O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, - W. Va. -,
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account the Minnesota Legislature's recent amendment of the notice of
claim requirement, which made notice of possible claims arising from
motor vehicle accidents unnecessary.19 Declaring the notice of claim re-
quirements unconstitutional would have benefitted only those claimants
whose causes of action had accrued before the effective date of the
amendment and who could not meet the actual notice requirement. In
addition, the Kossak court expressed the opinion that "in automobile ac-
cident situations it is reasonable to assume that a municipality will re-
ceive actual notice of the incident." 20 The facts of Kossak, therefore,
presented compelling reasons for not addressing the constitutionality of
the notice of claim requirement as applied to automobile accident vic-
tims.
The pivotal issue in Kossak was whether the one-year commencement
of suit requirement was unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. The Kossak court found that
the commencement of suit requirement created two distinct classes of
tortfeasors. 2 1 The court noted that the requirement subjects private
tortfeasors to the general six-year statute of limitations,22 but subjects
municipal tortfeasors to an abbreviated one-year statute of limitations,23
thereby exposing the former to a greater risk of liability than the latter.
In addition, the commencement of suit requirement draws a distinction
between the victims of municipal and private tortfeasors by imposing a
much shorter limitation period on the former. This unequal treatment
makes recovery more difficult for the victim of a municipal tort than for
the victim of a private tort. Such legislative classifications are subject to
judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause.24
237 S.E.2d 504 (1977) (state law requiring notice of claim within 30 days after cause of
action accrued held to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
19. 277 N.W.2d at 33. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(2) (1978) provides:
Notice shall not be required to maintain an action for damages for or on account
of any loss or injury within the scope of section 466.02 if such injury or loss...
involves a motor vehicle or other equipment owned by the municipality or oper-
ated by an officer, employee or agent of the municipality.
20. 277 N.W.2d at 33.
21. See i'd. at 34.
22. See id.; MINN. STAT. § 541.05(5) (1978).
23. See 277 N.W.2d at 34; MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1978).
24. See notes 56-58 inqfa and accompanying text. In determining whether state legis-
lation violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, several tests have
evolved. If neither a suspect criterion nor a fundamental right is involved, the traditional
standard of review is applied. Under this test of minimal scrutiny, a legislative classifica-
tion is sustained unless it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental ob-
jective. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1970). When a statutory
classification is based on a suspect criterion or unduly affects or interferes with a funda-
mental right, equal protection is denied unless the classification is necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
An intermediate standard of review, using a fair and substantial relation test, has been
19801
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The Kossak court applied the rational basis standard of review2 5 set
forth in Schwartz v. Tamo26 in determining that the commencement of
suit requirement denied equal protection. Under the Schwartz standard
of review, a legislative classification operates as a denial of equal protec-
tion if the classification does not apply uniformly to all persons similarly
situated. 27 The differences between those persons included and those
persons excluded from the classification must not be arbitrary, but genu-
ine and substantial. 28 In addition, the classification must be germane to
a lawful objective.
29
Equal protection arguments have been successful in several recent
cases in which similar statutes30 have been declared unconstitutional. 3
The Kossak court found this recent trend persuasive3 2 An examination
applied to cases involving near-suspect classifications or near-fundamental rights. See
Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71, 76 (1971); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d
810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). For a discussion of equal protection standards as applied to
notice of claim requirements, see Note, Notice of Claim Requirement Under the Minnesota Munic-
ipal Tort Liabihy Act, supra note 16, at 109-16.
25. See Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 189-90, 210 N.W.2d 221, 223-24 (1973).
26. 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803 (1973).
27. Id. at 362, 205 N.W.2d at 322.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 620, 194 N.W.2d 700, 701
(1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 232, 510 P.2d 879, 881, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079
(1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 811, 539 P.2d 845, 847
(1975); O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, - W. Va. -, -, 237 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1977). The
Kossak court felt that the notice of claim statutes involved in these cases were sufficiently
similar in nature to the commencement of suit requirement involved in Kossak v. Stalling so
as to provide a precedential basis for decision. See 277 N.W.2d at 33.
31. See, e.g., Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 623-24, 194 N.W.2d 700,
702 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 235, 510 P.2d 879, 883, cert. denid, 414 U.S.
1079 (1973); Zipser v. Pound, 69 Misc. 2d 152, 152-53, 329 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (White
Plains City Ct.), rev'dper curiam, 75 Misc. 2d 489, 348 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
32. See 277 N.W.2d at 33. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not, however, com-
pletely abandoned the idea that governmental entities may be accorded special protec-
tion. The court recently held in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801
(Minn. 1979), that a municipality could not be held liable for an allegedly negligent
building inspection that failed to disclose building code violations, unless special circum-
stances existed creating a special duty towards individual members of the public. Id. at
806. At least one dissenting justice felt that the Cracraft holding was inconsistent with
Kossak. Kossak represented "a significant stride forward in striking down such artificial
barriers which serve no purpose other than to foster the abolished doctrine of sovereign
immunity." Id. at 812 (Scott, J., dissenting).
The sovereign immunity doctrine was an inheritance of English law. See Russell v.
Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) (county not liable for injury sustained in
consequence of bridge being out of repair). In 1962 the Minnesota Supreme Court pro-
spectively abolished sovereign immunity for municipalities, school boards, and other gov-
ernmental subdivisions with respect to all tort claims arising after the 1963 legislative
session in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962). The Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act was passed in response to Spanel. See
(Vol. 6
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of these cases and of cases upholding the constitutionality of such statutes
sheds further light on the Kossak decision. Each of the cases discussed
involved notice of claim statutes and none were concerned with com-
mencement of suit requirements. 33 The Kossak court felt, however, that
these cases involved "legislation similar in scope"34 to the commence-
ment of suit requirement and thus provided a basis for determining the
constitutionality of that requirement.
The earliest successful equal protection attacks upon municipal notice
statutes occurred in Reich v. State Highway Department 35 and Turner v.
Staggs.36 In Reich each of the plaintiffs in three consolidated claims
against the state challenged the sixty-day notice provision of Michigan's
State Tort Claim Act 37 on equal protection grounds. 38 In striking down
the notice provision as violating equal protection, the majority of the
Michigan court reasoned that since the purpose of the State Tort Claim
Act was to waive state immunity, putting victims of governmental
tortfeasors on anything but an equal footing with victims of nongovern-
mental tortfeasors was inconsistent with this purpose.39 The court stated
that the notice requirement was contrary to this purpose since "[it] acts
as a special statute of limitations which arbitrarily bars the actions of the
victims of governmental negligence after only 60 days."40 The Reich
court did not consider the numerous justifications courts traditionally
Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act, ch. 798, 1963 Minn. Laws 1396 (current version
at MINN. STAT. §§ 466.01-.15 (1978 & Supp. 1979)). Similarly, state tort immunity was
prospectively abolished in Neiting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
The Minnesota Legislature responded by passing the State Tort Claims Act. See Act of
Apr. 20, 1976, ch. 331, § 33, 1976 Minn. Laws 1282, 1293-97 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 3.736 (1978)). It is significant that the Legislature chose to establish the same
statute of limitations period for claims made against the state as is applicable to tort
claims against private persons. See MINN. STAT. § 3.736(11) (1978).
33. See cases cited in notes 30-31 supra.
34. 277 N.W.2d at 33.
35. 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
36. 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879, cert. dented, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973). But see Zipser v.
Pound, 69 Misc. 2d 152, 329 N.Y.S.2d 494 (White Plains City Ct.), rev'dper curtaim, 75
Misc. 2d 489, 348 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
37. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1404 (Supp. 1979).
38. See 386 Mich. at 622, 194 N.W.2d at 702 (1974). In addition to raising an equal
protection claim, the plaintiff, a minor, contended that the 60-day notice of claim require-
ment violated his due process rights. The court agreed, relying on its own precedent in
Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970), in which the notice
requirement was found to be unconstitutional with respect to a plaintiff whose injuries
prevented him from complying with the requirement. 384 Mich. at 176-77, 180 N.W.2d
at 784. The Retch court acknowledged the similar disability of minors, and held that the
notice requirement was unconstitutional with respect to them as well. 386 Mich. at 622,
194 N.W.2d at 701-02.
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rely upon in support of notice provisions.41 It chose to rely instead on the
legislative waiver of sovereign immunity as the basis for its finding that
equal protection had been denied.
42
The Kossak court also relied on Turner in striking down the commence-
ment of suit requirement43 The Nevada notice of claim statute in Turner
required notice of a claim to be presented to the county within six
months as a precondition to suing the county.44 The Turner court, in
holding that the notice of claim statute violated equal protection,45
based its decision on the Reich rationale that by waiving governmental
immunity,46 the Legislature showed its intent to put all tortfeasors and
their victims on an equal footing.47 Because the notice requirement was
contrary to that intent, it violated equal protection by setting up differ-
ent classes of tortfeasors and tort victims.48
Similarly, in O'Nel v. City of Parkersburg,49 the West Virginia Court of
Appeals followed the Reich-Turner line of reasoning in holding that be-
cause the purpose of the municipal tort liability law was to place munici-
pal and private tortfeasors and their victims on an equal basis, the notice
requirement violated equal protection by acting as an arbitrary bar to
suits by those injured through municipal negligence.50
The "legislative intent" theory used by the Reich, Turner, and O'Ne'l
courts is troublesome. The right to equal protection under the laws is a
principle of constitutional magnitude5' that cannot be created or de-
stroyed by state legislation. Those courts nevertheless reasoned that their
respective state legislatures created the right to equality among govern-
mental and private tortfeasors and their victims by abrogating sovereign
immunity, thereby intending to put these parties on an equal footing.52
The three courts should have focused, as did the Kossak court,53 directly
41. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
42. See 386 Mich. at 623, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
43. See 277 N.W.2d at 33.
44. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 244.245, .250 (1975).
45, 89 Nev. at 235, 510 P.2d at 882.
46. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1977).
47. See 89 Nev. at 235, 510 P.2d at 882-83.
48. Id.
49. - W. Va. -, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
50. See id. at -, 237 S.E.2d at 508-09.
51. See note 14 supra.
52. This reasoning would be especially dubious in Minnesota since the Minnesota
Supreme Court has intimated that the Municipal Tort Liability Act, MINN. STAT.
§§ 466.01-.15 (1978 & Supp. 1979), is not intended to place municipal defendants on an
equal footing with private defendants. See McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 286 Minn.
240, 243-44, 175 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1970) ("The argument that in abrogating immunity
the legislature intended that governmental units should be liable in the same manner as a
private individual under like circumstances ignores the reality that there are many gov-
ernmental activities which have no private counterpart .... .
53. See 277 N.W.2d at 33-35.
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upon the constitutional issue-whether a rational basis existed for the
classifications created by the statutory requirements.
The Kossak court also relied on Hunter v. North Mason High School,54 in
which the Washington Supreme Court struck down the state's notice
statute55 on equal protection grounds. The court held that the classifica-
tions the notice requirement created between municipal and private
tortfeasors and their victims did not bear a fair and substantial relation-
ship 56 to the objectives the statute sought to serve. 57 The Hunter court
analyzed each of the purported objectives of the notice requirement-
investigation of claims, correction of defective municipal facilities, settle-
ment of claims, protection against stale claims and budget planning-
and concluded that "the only function the special treatment given gov-
ernmental bodies seems to perform is the simple protection of the govern-
54. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.96.020 (Supp. 1978).
56. The Hunter court is not the only one to have applied this intermediate level of
equal protection scrutiny to a notice of claim statute. In DeHusson v. City of Anchorage,
583 P.2d 791 (Alaska 1978), the court noted that:
[T]he distinctions drawn by the . . .notice of claim provision between govern-
mental and private tort-feasors are arbitrary and. . . the resultant categories are
suspect. Consequently, the City of Anchorage must meet a significant burden in
demonstrating that the distinctions and classifications created by the [notice of
claim] provision have a fair and substantial relation to legitimate governmental
objectives.
Id. at 796 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring). It seems that the Hunter and DeHusson courts were
following the most recent trend in subjecting the notice requirements to heightened equal
protection scrutiny. One commentator, for example, has reasoned that "[w]hile the right
of access to the courts for redress of a wrong is not presently considered a fundamental
right, it is sufficiently important within our system of justice to merit being subjected to
the intermediate, fair and substantial relation test." Note, Notice of Claim Requirement Under
the Minnesota Muni'cipal Tort Liability Act, supra note 16, at 113. One justice has even argued
that the right to seek redress in court for the wrongful act of another is of such a funda-
mental nature that strict scrutiny should be invoked in determining whether such statutes
violate the equal protection clause. See Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 909
(Iowa 1973) (Reynoldson, J., dissenting).
Since the Kossak court found that the commencement of suit requirement did not
even meet the rational basis test, it did not address the question of whether the intermedi-
ate or strict standard of review could ever be appropriate. 277 N.W.2d at 34 n.4. There is,
however, a compelling argument that the Minnesota court should apply a more rigorous
standard of equal protection review to the notice or commencement of suit provisions
should the issue come before it again. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 states that "[e]very person
is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive
in his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase,
completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws."
Id. Since the right to a remedy for every civil wrong is of constitutional stature in Minne-
sota, see Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 366, 215 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1974), legislative
classifications that impinge on that right should be subject to stricter judicial scrutiny than
rational basis review. See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
57. See 85 Wash. 2d 810, 816-18 & n.8, 539 P.2d 845, 849-50 & n.8.
1980]
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ment from liability for its own wrongdoing." 58 The notice statute
therefore did not survive the equal protection standard of review the
court applied.
Focusing on a constitutional analysis rather than on one based upon
legislative intent, the Kossak court held that the commencement of suit
requirement denies equal protection when the municipality has notice of
a claim arising out of an automobile accident with a municipal vehicle.59
The court referred to the five justifications traditionally used in support
of the notice of claim and commencement of suit requirements,60 and
observed that no rational governmental purpose could be served by the
additional requirement that suit be brought within one year of the notice
of claim.61 On that basis, the court struck down the commencement of
suit provision.6 2 By so holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court has re-
lieved victims of a municipality's negligence of a significant restriction on
their ability to gain redress for injuries. The court's language seems to
indicate that it would not hesitate to extend its holding to claimants
other than automobile accident victims.63
The Minnesota court has left open the question of whether the notice
of claim requirement is rationally related to the governmental purpose it
seeks to serve. The continued use of a constitutional analysis as opposed
to a legislative analysis places the constitutionality of the notice of claim
58. Id. at 817-18, 539 P.2d at 850.
59. 277 N.W.2d at 35.
60. Id. at 34. The justifications frequently used in support of special notice require-
ments for municipalities are, first, that the notice requirement gives the municipality an
opportunity to investigate claims while facts are fresh ansd witnesses readily available. See,
e.g., Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 503, 370 P.2d 334, 335, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 631 (1962); Lutsch v. City of Chicago, 318 Il. App. 156, 159, 47 N.E.2d 545,
546 (1943); Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207
(1966); Zack v. Borough of Saxonburg, 386 Pa. 463, 465, 126 A.2d 753, 754 (1956). Sec-
ond, notice serves to encourage negotiAtion and settlement without litigation. See, e.g.,
City of Anniston v. Rosser, 275 Ala. 659, 662, 158 So. 2d 99, 101 (1963); Taylor v. King,
104 Ga. App. 589, 591, 122 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1961); Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274
Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1966); Frasch v. City of New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 43,
153 N.W. 121, 122 (1915). Third, early notice allows the municipality to correct deficient
facilities and functions before more people suffer injury. See, e.g., Hirth v. Village of Long
Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207-08 (1966); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27
Utah 2d 27, 30, 492 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1972). Fourth, notice protects the municipality from
stale or fraudulent claims. See Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143
N.W.2d 205, 208 (1966). Finally, courts argue that special notice of future claims facili-
tates budget planning. See, e.g., King v. Johnson, 47 11L 2d 247, 251, 265 N.E.2d 874, 876
(1970); Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Iowa 1973). The emphasis of
these justifications is clearly on the protection of the public fisc, with an ancillary concern
for public safety. See Note, Notue of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, supra
note 16, at 422-23.
61. 277 N.W.2d at 34.
62. Id. at 35.
63. See id. at 33-34.
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requirement in doubt. Some courts, however, have found notice of claim
statutes constitutional on the ground that such provisions create classifi-
cations that do not violate equal protection.64 In Lunday v. Vogelmann,6 5
the Iowa Supreme Court held that because the notice requirement was
reasonably related to the traditional purposes such statutes serve, it did
not violate equal protection.66 Despite its finding that the commence-
ment of suit statute was unconstitutional, the Minnesota Supreme Court
did not actually reject the Lunday reasoning in Kossak. The court simply
held that, first, the notice requirement was satisfied by actual notice to
the city,67 and second, that the notice requirement, if satisfied, renders
the commencement of suit requirement superfluous and therefore unnec-
essary to the furtherance of any governmental objective. 68
The court may therefore find the Lunday approach more appropriate
for determining the constitutionality of the notice of claim statute, de-
spite the precedents provided by Reich, Turner, and O'Neil. Nevertheless,
nothing in the notice of claim requirement compels a finding of legiti-
mate governmental purposes or objectives. Instead, the purposes the no-
tice requirement ostensibly serve appear to have more basis in conjecture
than in actuality.69 The primary justification for questioning the valid-
ity of the notice of claim statute is the same as that used by the court in
striking down the commencement of suit requirement: that the provision
creates an unreasonable classification that serves no legitimate govern-
mental purpose. If presented with a case in which a municipality has not
received the required notice of claim, the Minnesota court should ex-
pand its holding in Kossak by declaring the notice of claim statute uncon-
stitutional as a violation of equal protection.
64. See Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1962) (public agencies afford a proper subject for legislative classification);
Ocampo v. City of Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 137 N.W.2d 477 (1965) (notice statute is
constitutional as applied to minors).
65. 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973). Plaintiff sought damages against a school district
and a municipality for negligence, but had failed to give written notice of the claim to the
municipality or school district within 60 days as required by statute. Id. at 905-06; see
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.5 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
66. 213 N.W.2d at 907-08.
67. 277 N.W.2d at 33.
68. See id. at 34.
69. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1972).
1980]
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/9
11
et al.: Torts—Municipal Tort Liability—Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980
